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This paper maps notions of insecurity and security policy within the European Union (EU), with a particular 
emphasis on terrorism and organised crime. The analysis reveals manifold and sometimes diverse dynamics 
with regard to threat perceptions and policy preferences of European political agents. Both notional changes 
and continuities are characteristic for the development of threat perceptions in Europe since the 1990s. Only 
recently, official statements have become informed by economic thinking. European counter-terrorism and 
anti-crime policies experienced a ‘learning curve’, significantly influenced and pushed by the creation of the 
European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Overall, a number of indicators can be extracted from the 
analysis that hint at underlying logics according to which notions of insecurity are shaped and which, more 
generally, guide the economics of security.   
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INTRODUCTION  
What is guiding the economics of security? More precisely: What are the foundations and 
determinants of contemporary security policy choices? What is the rationale behind the 
construction of the one or the other notion of insecurity and the formulation of security 
policy? If we really want to understand the drivers of security policy choices in Europe, we 
also have to take a closer  look at the definitions of (in)security provided  by Europe’s 
political  agents  and  the  way  they  evolve.  Without  any  question,  their  perceptions  and 
actions crucially co-determine the levels of realized security and insecurity in Europe.  
This paper traces notions of insecurity and security policy within the European Union 
(EU) in a  historical  perspective. It conducts an  empirical  mapping of security-relevant 
documents issued by EU bodies in the field of terrorism and organised crime, as well as by 
selected EU Member States. An analysis of the notions of terrorism and organised crime as 
two human-induced sources of insecurity in these documents seems particularly instructive 
since the perceptions on their nature and consequences, as well as the preferred policy 
mixes against them have undergone a number of changes in Europe since the 1990s. These 
changes are reflected at the EU level and also in the EU Member States. The analysis is 
guided  by  the  following  research  questions:  How  important  are  notions  of  insecurity 
(defined  as  threats  of  terrorism  and  organised  crime)  at  the  EU  level  and  within  the 
Member States? What are seen as the major causes of insecurity? How are the actors of 
insecurity characterised? What major consequences of insecurity are anticipated? Are the 
consequences and costs of policy responses against insecurity (including, but not limited 
to, economic ones) considered?  
                                                 




The paper is divided into two analytical chapters. Chapter 1 traces the changes and 
continuities in the European policy-makers’ perceptions of terrorism and organised crime 
as sources of insecurity since the 1990s. It first looks at the perceived threat level over 
time, then turns to the assumptions on the patterns of terrorism and organised crime, before 
tracking  down  concepts  about  the  motives  and  motivations  of  the  actors  of  these 
insecurities. In Chapter 2, the paper addresses the question of whether and how political 
agents within the EU consider the costs and consequences of insecurity. The analysis is 
pursued on two levels: on a first level, the paper examines how European policy-makers 
calculate the costs of terrorism and organised crime when these insecurities materialise; on 
a second level, it is explored whether and to what extent officials anticipate and calculate 
the  costs  of  their  own  anti-crime  and  counter-terrorism  policies.  The  Conclusions 
summarise the most important insights from the historical mapping, and derive a number 
of  criteria  (logics)  according  to  which  prevalent  notions  of  insecurity  are  (typically) 
shaped.  
EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME AS 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY  
Since the  last decade of the 20th century, European officials  have  been referring with 
increasing regularity to terrorism  and organised  crime as two  major security  concerns. 
Obviously, terrorism and organised crime have since become more important as sources of 
insecurity in the EU. What are, then, exactly the perceptions of terrorism and organised 
crime as ‘threats’ and causes of insecurity on the part of European political agents and how 
have these perceptions evolved over the years? 
Estimating the threat level: relevance of terrorism and organised crime as sources of 
insecurity in Europe 
Looking  at  the  history  of  terrorism  and  organised  crime,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the 
perceptions of these two phenomena as sources of insecurity in Europe and, subsequently, 
the role they played in European political cooperation have differed significantly among 
the EU Member States and over time. These divergences have certainly much to do with 
the  different  degrees  to  which  the  European  countries  were  affected  by  terrorism  and 
organised crime in the past. It was particularly terrorism that had played a role in European 
political cooperation already since the 1970s. Politically motivated separatism and left-
wing extremism were virulent in various parts of Europe throughout the last third of the 
20
th century. Yet, terrorism continued to represent a major security priority in Europe even 
after terrorist organisations in Germany and Italy stopped their activities or ceased to exist 
by the late 1980s and 1990s. This explains how the issue found its way into the Treaty of 
the European Union (TEU) adopted in Maastricht in 1993, and was fixed as a priority 
objective among the matters of common interest.
1  
However, trans-border  criminal  activity  in  general  –  which  would  have  implied  the 
inclusion of organised crime – was not explicitly mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty. The 
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TEU makes only implicit reference to “cross-border crime”, namely in the context of the 
intended set-up of a European police agency (Europol) and the expressed need for closer 
police and judicial cooperation (Fijnaut and Paoli 2006: 629). This is mainly the result of a 
comparably  low  level  of  threat  perception  with  regard  to  organised  crime  in  most  of 
Europe  at  that  time.  With  the  self-evident  exception  of  Italy,  where  the  traditional 
entanglement of criminal syndicates in politics and the economy has always been an area 
of high concern, none of the European countries perceived organised crime to be security-
relevant. This attitude of ignoring and keeping the issue “in a box” (Hobbes 2006: 424) 
remained unchanged until the 1990s, although in the 1980s organised criminal activities 
with international outreach, in particular drug trafficking, had started to flourish across the 
European territory (Gomez-Cespedes and Stangeland 2006: 397; Kleemans 2006: 303). 
This  attitude  changed  somewhat  in  the  course  of  the  further  European  integration 
process. Following the creation of the Single European Market in 1992 and the removal of 
border controls within the EU, fears arose that the increase in flows of people, goods, 
services and capital across Europe might create new opportunities for cross- and trans-
border criminality within the EU,  including terrorism. The La Gomera Declaration on 
terrorism formulated at the 1995 European Council in Madrid (European Council 1995) 
amply  demonstrates  these  fears:  terrorism  is  for  the  first  time  directly  linked  with 
international organised crime, as it “is developing strategies and using methods” of the 
latter (ibid.). 
After that, the Council only slowly became more alert and active on organised crime. 
Apart from publishing two reports in 1993 on the dangers of transnational organised crime 
for Europe, the issue only gained momentum in 1996, when the European Council at its 
summit  in  Dublin reacted to the  murder of an  Irish  journalist – committed during the 
summit – who had regularly reported on organised criminality in Ireland (Fijnaut and Paoli 
2006:  634).  With  the  revision  of  the  TEU  in  Amsterdam  (1997),  “the  fight  against 
organised crime – in all its various guises – [became] central to the Third Pillar” of the EU 
(Fijnaut and Paoli 2006: 629/630).
2 From that moment on, both terrorism and organised 
crime were regularly  mentioned as  “serious crimes”, “acts of violence against the  life, 
physical integrity or liberty of a person” and “major threats” to European security (cf.: 
Council of the European Union 1998a: 22; Council of the European Union 1998c; Council 
of the European Union 1998d: 4).  
In conjunction with this change in perception on the EU level, the notion of organised 
crime as a prime source of insecurity was quickly put high on the political agenda of nearly 
all EU Member States (Den Boer 2001: 259). In 1998, the Council issued a Joint Action 
making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the EU Member 
States,  including  also  a  definition  of  criminal  organisations  (Council  of  the  European 
Union  1998c:  1).  Alarming  EU-wide  situation  reports  had  been  regularly  issued  since 
1997, pointing at an increase in organised crime activities in Europe, both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms (e.g. Europol 2000b: 11; (Europol 2001: 5). It was probably the 
increase in available information that, at the turn of the millennium, finally contributed to 
the formulation of the EU Millennium Strategy on the prevention and control of organised 
crime (European Union 2000).  
While this comprehensive strategy paper gives an exhaustive overview of the perceived 
threat  posed  by  organised  crime  to  the  EU,  and  identifies  measures  through  which 
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organised crime could be addressed, it lacks a clear-cut definition of what forms of crime 
the phenomenon concretely comprises. This lack of precision clearly reflects the lack of 
consensus among the Member States about the substance of organised crime at that time 
(cf.:  Kinzig  and  Luczak  2006:  339;  Levi  2006:  831;  Lalam  2006:  358),  ranging  from 
money  laundering,  smuggling,  forgery  and  fraud  over  arms  and  drug  trafficking, 
trafficking in human beings to economic crime. With regard to the perceived threat level, 
the strategy reiterates the assessments made in earlier reports, and affirms that “the level of 
organised crime in the EU is increasing”, that organised crime is “infiltrating into many 
aspects of society throughout Europe”, and that it poses a “major threat” to the peoples of 
the  EU,  particularly  to  its  “freedoms  and  legal  rights”.  Most  alarming  is  the  fact  that 
organised crime is becoming increasingly international and “involved in the licit as well as 
in the illicit market, using non-criminal business specialists and structures to assist them in 
their criminal activities” (European Union 2000: 3). 
All of  a sudden, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001  in New York drew the 
attention  of  policy-makers  and  the  public  back  to  terrorism.  Europe-wide  surveys 
conducted  shortly  after  9/11  provide  evidence  that  public  awareness  and  fear  of 
transnational terrorism increased dramatically, even in countries that had not had traumatic 
experiences with terrorism on their territory. The new alertness was mainly driven by the 
view that the ‘new’ threat represented by al-Qaeda and/or its affiliates had reached a new, 
global  dimension.  In  its  Decision  on  Combating  Terrorism,  issued  in  June  2002,  the 
Council called terrorism “one of the most serious violations” of the principles “which are 
common to the Member States” (Council of the European Union 2002b: 3), and made a 
first attempt to characterize the ‘new’ threat and to assess its consequences for Europe. 
However, taking a closer look into the document, it becomes obvious that the EU is again 
confronted with the problem of clearly defining the threat. The EU’s definition basically 
builds on previous notions, the most important of which is the idea that terrorism is a 
criminal act and offence, and not – like in the U.S. – an act of war. But beyond that, 
international  terrorism  is  defined  in  terms  of  potential  consequences  rather  than  in  its 
substance (see also p. 12).  
The  new attention on  international terrorism as  a  major source of  insecurity  is also 
reflected in the Council’s 2003 Guidelines for a common approach to the fight against 
terrorism, where it is stated that “terrorism is one of the most serious common challenges 
facing the international community” (Council of the European Union 2008: 3), and in the 
2003  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS),  the  EU’s  conceptual  framework  for  external 
action.  Terrorism  is  called  here  a  “strategic  threat”  to  the  EU’s  interests,  along  with 
organised crime, proliferation and state failure (European Union 2003: 3). After the suicide 
bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the first two terrorist attacks perpetrated 
by international terrorists in Europe, the EU developed its threat assessment in particular 
around the notion of terrorism as a strategic threat. In its Declaration on Terrorism, issued 
on 24 March 2004 immediately after the attacks in Madrid, the Council called terrorism a 
“strategic threat to the whole of Europe” (European Council 2004: 1). And the 2005 EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy states: 
“Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. It poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of 
our democratic societies […]. Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances” (Council of 
the European Union 2005: 6). 
Today,  international  terrorism  is  perceived  as  “one  of  the  most  serious”  security 
concerns to the EU (Council of the European  Union 2006: 18; EU  Counter-Terrorism 




basis of the assumption that international terrorism basically threatened the EU Member 
States – in particular those perceived as enemies of Islam and designated as ‘legitimate’ 
targets  due  to  their  involvement  in  Iraq  or  Afghanistan”  (Europol  2006a:  1),  they 
increasingly perceive the EU threatened as an entity itself (Cornish, et al. 2008: 14). One of 
the most recent EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) states that the Union 
as  “a  political  institution  is  increasingly  being  identified  as  a  symbol  and  has  already 
become threatened by terrorists” (Europol 2007: 36). 
The EU also continues to closely watch the developments in organised crime in Europe. 
In 2007, Europol reported that the annual global profits made by trafficking of human 
beings are estimated by the United Nations at between $ 7 and 10 billion. The EU assumes 
that “a fair proportion of this figure is generated in Europe” (Europol 2005: 15), and the 
European Commission expects the level of organised criminal activity in the EU even to 
rise in the future (Commission of the European Communities 2007c: 9; Europol 2007: 8-
10). However, the traumatic experience caused by the major scale terrorist attacks of the 
last  years  both  in  and  outside  the  EU  has  resulted  in  a  situation  where,  currently, 
international  terrorism  is  attracting  far  more  attention  as  a  source  of  insecurity  than 
organised crime in the minds of most European political agents. 
Unknown insecurities: assumptions on the patterns of terrorism and organised crime 
EU  officials  and  national  policy-makers  do  not  tire  insisting  that  it  is  important  to 
understand the patterns and concepts of international terrorism and transnational organised 
crime when considering measures to limit their impact. Already in the 1990s, EU Member 
States started to collect empirical information on both sources of insecurity. On this basis, 
the EU (after 2006 mainly through Europol) has compiled and  issued EU-wide annual 
situation reports and threat assessments. However, European and Member States’ officials 
still face difficulties in grasping the patterns and concepts underlying the two phenomena. 
In  various  documents,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  refer  to  the  high  complexity  of 
terrorism  and  organised  crime  and  their  causes,  a  diagnosis  which  speaks  of  a  certain 
helplessness when it comes to understanding these sources of insecurity.  
European policy-makers see a number of basic similarities with regard to the patterns of 
international  terrorism  and  organised  crime.  Firstly,  their  perception  is  guided  by  the 
understanding that neither terrorism nor organised criminal groups are confined to national 
borders. Terrorism and organised crime are seen to have a global scope and to be able to 
act worldwide; to that end, they are perceived to be transnational in nature, with the EU 
being used as “a base and a target” for their activity (European Union 2003: 3). Secondly, 
the organisational patterns of international terrorism and contemporary organised crime are 
characterised  by  network  structures  rather  than  rigid  organisational  hierarchies.  And 
thirdly, with their transnational structure and network configuration, and the use of new 
technical, communicational and other opportunities for their criminal conduct, both groups 
of  actors  display  a  high  level  of  flexibility  (European  Commission  2003:  9;  European 
Union 2000: 3-4). 
Especially  this  last  point  reveals  that,  underneath  these  common  characteristics  and 
similarities, both phenomena tend to constantly change their faces, to give room for the 
emergence  of  new  actors  and  to  increasingly  diversify  themselves  in  terms  of 
organisational  structures  and  operational  methods  (cf.:  Commission  of  the  European 




1990s, European policy-makers have had varying conceptions with regard to the patterns 
of international terrorism and organised crime:  
a.  Patterns  of  international  terrorism:  Immediately  after  9/11  and  even  after  the 
bombings  in  Madrid  and  London,  the  overall  view  in  the  EU  was  that  international 
terrorism  in  Europe  was  part  of  a  “global  jihad”  led  by  al-Qaeda  as  a  strategic  and 
ideological centre (Cornish, et al. 2008: 3-4). This kind of globally operating terrorism was 
marked  by  an  “ease  of  travel,  transfer  of  money  and  communication”  (Council  of  the 
European Union 2005: 8). Most surprisingly to the European authorities, the evidence from 
the investigations of the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, as well as of other smaller-
scale plots planned on the European territory, suggested that many of these plots or attacks 
had been planned and executed by regional terrorist groups “not necessarily linked to a 
global network” (Commission of the European Communities 2005c: 12). Moreover, many 
of  the  perpetrators  of  terrorist  attacks  in  the  EU  turned  out  to  be  EU  citizens,  often 
stemming  from  immigrant  families,  or  foreigners  with  diverse  national  backgrounds 
residing  and  living  in  the  Member  States  with  official  permits  (Europol  2006b:  1). 
Apparently, these amateurs (or often termed “home-grown” terrorists) were part of self-
activated groups of radicalised young men (Kirby 2007: 418), not recruited or instructed by 
international  terrorist  networks,  and  able  to  conceive,  plan,  finance  and  execute  their 
attacks autonomously (Stationery Office 2006). With this trend of amateurisation and the 
emergence of a ‘new generation’ of terrorists, European officials, in the recent past, started 
to concentrate more of their attention on the role of the Internet as a tool for dissemination 
of propaganda, the posting of  instructions and  online  manuals  intended  for training or 
planning of attacks and addressing potential sympathisers (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005c: 4; and later in: Commission of the European Communities 2007b: 
32). 
b.  Patterns  of  organised  crime:  These  trends  of  decentralisation  and  regeneration 
observed in the field of terrorism also apply to the patterns of organised crime in Europe. 
Political  agents  see  “the  continuing  development  from  rigid,  monolithic  structures  to 
smaller, more flexible and loosely arranged networks” (Europol 2000a: 10). The contacts 
between genuinely ‘European’ (indigenous) and non-European (non-indigenous) organised 
criminals are getting closer, with an increase in foreigners involved in organised criminal 
groups in Europe (Europol 2000b: 7). Most recently, Europol has, moreover, identified 
some “assimilation” trends, and speaks of the emergence of “second generation” groups 
that consist of people of a non-indigenous ethnicity living permanently in, or having the 
nationality of, the EU country of activity, where, additionally, the middle or even top levels 
of the criminal organisation may also reside (Europol 2007: 8). Another trend is observed 
with regard to the specialization and diversification of organised criminal group activity 
(Commission of the European Communities 2001a: 8), as well as the mixing of low and 
high risk activities, for instance drug trafficking alongside cigarette smuggling (Europol 
2001:  12).  Most  importantly,  though,  what  worries  European  officials  is  the  fact  that 
organised criminal structures increasingly hide in legitimate business structures within the 
EU (European Union 2000: 34; Vitorino 2001; Commission of the European Communities 
2005a:  4;  Europol  2006a:  5;  Europol  2007:  10).  They  tend  to  build  in-house  money 
laundering capabilities, reaching  in  some cases  such  high-level proficiency that  money 
laundering becomes their principal, or only, criminal activity. This makes it most difficult 
to uncover such criminal activity. 
These ‘new’ forms of organised crime and international terrorism are more and more 
perceived  as  being  interconnected  to  a  certain  degree,  which  leads  to  a  mutual 




the  EU  in  particular  in  the  ESS  (European  Union  2003:  4),  but  also  in  other  official 
documents. Speaking about potential links, these are usually connected with the financing 
of terrorism. Connections between terrorism and organised crime emerge when terrorists 
engage in organised criminality (i.e. using techniques like credit card fraud and extortion in 
order to raise funds for terrorist activities), or, vice versa, when criminals help to finance 
terrorism out of opportunistic reasons and, as a result, help terrorists to reach their goals 
(Council of Europe 2005: 5). 
What drives the drivers? Speculating on the motivations of the actors of insecurity 
While there are a  number of similarities and  links between  international terrorism and 
organised crime with regard to organisational  structures and  methods,  it has  become a 
commonplace among European officials that with regard to the motivations “organised 
crime and terrorism are – a priori – distinct concepts” (Council of Europe 2005: 5). Even 
though the EU defines  both groups of actors as “criminals” who pursue their  interests 
“ruthlessly” (Serious Organised Crime Agency 2008: 1), using similar or sometimes even 
the  same  methods,  international  terrorists  and  organised  criminals  act  out  of  different 
motives.  Organised  crime  “is  primarily  aimed  at  obtaining  financial  or  other  material 
benefits”, whereas “terrorism relies on violence-induced fears to change established legal 
and  constitutional  orders  and  policies”  (Council  of  Europe  2005:  5).  The  deliberate 
distinction between the two sources of insecurity made in this statement not only clearly 
defines  international  terrorism  and  organised  crime  as  two  differently  motivated 
phenomena, but also speaks of differing attributions with regard to the level of rationality 
that underlies the pursuit of the one and of the other. 
a.  Motivations  of  organised  criminality:  In  the  EU,  there  has  been  a  relatively 
established perception that the driving force behind organised criminal activity is profit-
making (European Council 1996; Council of the European Union 1997b; Europol 2001: 
13;  European  Union  2000;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2001a:  8; 
Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 12), with profit being defined as “the 
accumulation of wealth” (Europol 2001: 13). This definition carries a very strong notion of 
an  actor  whose  interests  lie  in  its  own  economic  and  material  well-being.  Organised 
criminal  organisations  are  basically  described  as  entrepreneurial  and  business-like 
structures (European Union 2000: 3; United Kingdom Home Office 2004: 7). Accordingly, 
organised crime is regarded as a “criminal market activity”, its actors as “criminal market 
players” (Europol 2006a: 8).  
From  this  interpretation  it  follows  that  organised  criminals  are  highly  rational, 
strategically  operating  and  opportunistic  actors,  who  carefully  calculate  the  risks  and 
profits  of  their  operations  (Europol  2001:  12).  That  is:  they  follow  cost-benefit 
considerations by adhering to a high-profit low-risk approach and by seeking all forms of 
opportunities  for  criminal  penetration  and  quick  profit  (Commission  of  the  European 
Communities 2001a: 8). The underlying understanding of strategically operating organised 
criminals is also highlighted by the statement that organised crime “does not spread at 
random”  (European  Union  2000:  15).  Motivations  for  criminal  conduct  rise  in 
environmental settings with conducive opportunity structures, be they the advantages of 
the  effects  of  globalisation  (open  borders  and  free  travel  and  trade,  communication) 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007c: 9), legal loopholes, or low sentences 
that are given  in the  event of a conviction (Europol 2005: 16). Under this perception, 




maintain  hegemony  over  rackets  and  enterprises  such  as  extortion  and  narcotics 
smuggling; corruption is a means of reducing the criminals’ own risk, maintaining control 
and making profit. 
b.  Motivations  of  international  terrorists:  Just  as  European  officials  are  sure  that 
material gain is the basic motivation for organised crime, they assume that the interests of 
internationally operating terrorists lie in the induction of violence and destruction-based 
intimidation  and  fear  (Council  of  the  European  Union  2002b:  4;  Commission  of  the 
European Communities 2006a: 12). When looking more closely at the reflections made by 
the  EU  about  the  driving  forces  behind  terrorism,  much  is  about  radical  beliefs  and 
attitudes. Terrorists are characterised as “fanatics” and “extremists”, who have adopted a 
worldview  that  “brings  individuals  to  consider  and  justify  violence”  (Council  of  the 
European Union 2005: 8) and who are “willing to use unlimited violence to cause mass 
casualties” (European Union 2003: 3). This accounts for traditional forms of terrorism in 
Europe, but even more for international terrorism, which is caused by “violent religious 
extremism” (European Union 2003: 3), to be more precise by an “abusive interpretation of 
Islam” (Commission of the European Communities 2005c: 2).  
All these characterisations obviously imply a different level of rationality on the part of 
international terrorists compared to that assumed vis-à-vis organised criminals. One might 
even say that European policy-makers anticipate a lower level of rationality when speaking 
about international terrorists than was/is the case with traditional domestic terrorism. The 
commitment level of members, affiliates and sympathisers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist 
terrorist networks seems to be extremely high, and the loss of one’s own life – usually the 
highest  price  one  would  think  of  –  no  obstacle  for  action.  Accordingly,  international 
terrorism has been termed by the EU as “arbitrary” and “irrational” in nature (Commission 
of the European Communities 2007a: 28).  
From  this  it  follows  that  central  to  the  EU’s  reflections  on  the  motivations  of 
international terrorists is the question of how and why they become radical and turn to 
violence. As a rule, European policy-makers proceed on the assumption that the decision to 
turn to violent extremism is determined by the “conditions in society, which may create an 
environment in which individuals can become more easily radicalised” (Council of the 
European  Union  2005:  9).  The  lack  of  education  and  integration  in  a  society  may 
substantially contribute to radicalisation, as this makes individuals vulnerable to simplistic 
thinking and intolerance (Commission of the European Communities 2005c: 11-12). The 
lack  of  integration  into  a  society  can  lead  to  a  feeling  of  exclusion,  discrimination  or 
alienation, a feeling not to be accepted and to be “left out of social and economic change” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005c: 12-15). As is underlined in the ESS, 
such feelings of grievance and anger are global phenomena which arise in an environment 
where poverty, instability or conflicts persist (European Commission 2003: 10).  
PAYING THE PRICE OF INSECURITY: WHAT DO TERRORISM AND 
ORGANISED CRIME COST US? 
“Insecurity entails high costs” (Commission of the European Communities 2006b: 18): this 
firm statement given by the European Commission in 2006 demonstrates that European 
policy-makers  in  fact anticipate costs of  insecurity. But, taking a closer  look, the term 
‘cost’ seems to be a real bottleneck: what kind(s) of costs are political agents in Europe 




Costs and consequences caused by terrorism and organised crime 
Officials from the EU and the Member States have been thinking about the consequences 
of actual terrorist attacks and organised criminal activity since the 1990s, although in the 
beginning  on  a  rather  general  basis.  It  is  not  surprising  that  initial  reflections  on  the 
potential consequences of terrorism and organised crime read quite similar, as both sources 
of insecurity are perceived at heart as ‘criminality’ and, hence, as similar in nature. In the 
1996 European Council conclusions on the Report of the High-level group on organised 
crime it is noted that  
“the activities of criminal organisations, in particular in the field of trafficking in drugs and human beings, 
corruption, money laundering and terrorism are affecting the integrity of the society as a whole” (European 
Council 1996).  
On the EU level, officials started to formulate the consequences of organised crime and 
terrorism in more detail in two basic documents: the Millennium Strategy on Organised 
Crime and the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. These documents 
also include detailed analyses of the threat posed by organised crime (European Union 
2000: 3) and terrorism (Council of the European Union 2002b: 4), and make extensive use 
of such dictions like “loss”, “harm”, “damage”, “destruction” and “instability”, in order to 
describe the potential impact and consequences that the two threats may have. Potential 
consequences of terrorism and organised crime are identified for a wide range of societal 
spheres: 
 Human/individual  consequences  relate  to  immediate  human  victims,  harm  and 
restraints to personal life and life integrity caused by terrorism and organised crime. 
Such harm can have a short-term dimension (i.e. physical injuries) as well as a long-
term  dimension  due  to  intimidation,  fear  and  other  physical  and  psychological 
repercussions (EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 2007: 11; Europol 2006a: 10).  
 Societal  consequences  are  understood  as  collective  societal  costs  in  terms  of 
damages to, and undermining of, societal openness and tolerance (Council of the 
European Union 2002b: 4; European Commission 2003: 3; Europol 2006a: 10). 
 Political consequences are, in the understanding of European policy-makers, closely 
linked  to  societal  consequences,  since  anti-social  behaviour  subverts  democracy 
(European Council 1995) and the values “on which the Union is founded” (Council 
of the European Union 2002b: 4; European Council 2004: 1; Commission of the 
European  Communities  2005c:  1;  Council  of  the  European  Union  2005:  6; 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2007e:  10)  and,  thus,  may  seriously 
destabilise  its  democratic  political  system  and  fundamental  constitutional  and 
political structures (European Commission 2003: 3).  
 Physical  damages  and  destruction  of  buildings  and  infrastructure  are  mainly 
envisaged  in the context of terrorism and  its consequences. Targets may  include 
“government  or  public  facilities,  a  transport  system,  an  infrastructure  facility, 
including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a 
public place or private property” (Council of the European Union 2002b: 4).  
 Economic consequences are, in this early phase, mainly reflected in the context of 
organised crime. This might be due to a broad number of estimates and figures that 
have already been available in the Member States since the early 1990s, for instance 




affecting the financial interests of the EU and its Member States, or on the economic 
value  of  seized  and  confiscated  assets.  With  regard  to  terrorism,  however,  EU 
policy-makers obviously lacked, at that time, a more sophisticated understanding of 
how terrorism affects the economic realm. What is referred to are, more generally, 
damages  in terms of wealth and prosperity and  “major economic  loss”  in  which 
terrorist attacks may result (European Council 1995). This may probably be due to 
the  fact  that  only  few  information  and  figures  on  the  actual  economic  damage 
caused by large-scale terrorist attacks were available; it might also be an evidence of 
a  certain  reluctance,  or  even  inability,  to  apply  economic  thinking  to this  social 
phenomenon.    
What can be noted is that, at this point, the term ‘cost’ is deliberately omitted, let alone that 
there are no attempts to measure or quantify the impact of these sources of insecurity. Only 
by 2005, a cognitive and methodological turn can be traced in the EU’s reflections on the 
consequences of terrorism and organised crime. Since then, the EU has introduced a cost-
benefit perspective to its reflections on the consequences of insecurity, and has started to 
consider the broader socio-economic implications of large-scale terrorism and organised 
crime. It is also at this stage that the diction ‘cost’ appears more prominently in related 
national and EU documents. This new perspective has arisen out of the insight that EU’s 
economies are complex in structure, highly interdependent and vulnerable, and that large-
scale terrorist attacks and ‘disguised’ organised criminal activity may inflict costs not only 
to the areas directly affected (primary costs), but also to the wider economic supply chains 
(indirect or secondary costs) (Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 9) and, 
thus, to the economy as a whole. Under this new perspective, however, the consequences 
have become more and more diffuse and difficult to grasp. That is why the EU started to 
consider more sophisticated ways of measuring and calculating the costs resulting from 
terrorist attacks and organised criminal activity. With regard to organised crime, in 2005 
the EU Commission explicitly formulated a demand that a “further developing, testing and 
dissemination  of  a  methodology  for  studies  of  economic  sector’s  vulnerability  to 
O[rganised] C[rime] is [..] needed”, on the basis of which it will be possible to measure 
crime and  victimisation (Commission of the European Communities 2005a: 3). By the 
same token, in 2006 the Council acknowledged that “without accurate cost data […] it is 
very difficult to quantify the costs ensuing from potential terrorist attacks, natural disasters 
or other major occurrences” (Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 10). 
A first example for an attempt to get more clarity about such direct and indirect costs 
and to more accurately measure them is a threat assessment on organised crime in the UK, 
issued by the British Home Office in 2004. The document stipulates that organised crime 
induces  high  secondary  (indirect)  costs  to  the  whole  licit  sector  in  the  UK,  as  it 
impoverishes citizens (through higher taxes and consumer costs) and reduces the amount 
of money available to key public financial services (United Kingdom Home Office 2004: 
2). In a first step, the threat assessment develops criteria in order to measure ‘harm’, and, in 
a second step, translates these measures into costs. Types of harm are classified according 
to economic, individual and social criteria, and broadly correspond to what has been the 
state of the art in official documents so far. The assessment of the overall harm caused by 
organised crime in the UK follows three criteria (United Kingdom Home Office 2004: 8): 
firstly,  the  direct  economic  and  social  costs  of  organised  crime,  ranging  from 
straightforward financial losses to health and crime harms; secondly, more indirectly, the 
level of public concern about organised crime and the problems it causes (availability of 
drugs, fear which organised crime can inflict on particular neighbourhoods); and, thirdly, 




Although  no  explicit  calculation  is  presented  in  the  document,  it  is  stated  that  the 
“[p]reliminary results from this exercise suggest that the losses and harms caused by all 
forms of organised crime may be up to £ 40 billion a year” (United Kingdom Home Office 
2004: 8). This figure, however, has been adjusted several times in the following years – not 
necessarily due to changes in the level of organised crime in the UK, but rather as a result 
of changes in methodology. As was also acknowledged by the British officials, ‘harm’ 
“remains  difficult  to  define  clearly  and  seize  accurately”  (Serious  Organised  Crime 
Agency  2008:  4).  Most  interestingly,  the  OCTA  reports  compiled  by  Europol  merely 
analyse the situation and do not go into more detail in terms of costs. Rather, the EU, in its 
documents,  refers  to organised  crime  cost  assessments  compiled  by  other  international 
institutions, such as, for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2006, the EU 
quoted an IMF assessment, according to which the profits from organised crime in Europe 
lie  at  between  2  and  5  per  cent  of  Europe's  total  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP) 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006b: 18).  
In 2006, policy-makers at EU level started to model the impact of insecurity in more 
detail, with a special focus on large-scale terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure such as 
power  stations,  laboratories  housing  deadly  viruses,  or  transport,  energy  and 
telecommunication networks (Commission of the European Communities 2006b: 18). The 
particular concern on critical infrastructure stemmed from the perceived high vulnerability 
and the “massive” macroeconomic consequences that such an attack might have for the 
European economies. According to the EU, the costs in the case of such incidents can 
quickly  grow  in  size  and  impact,  and  extend  to  the  business  and  the  wider  public, 
destabilizing the stock markets and affecting consumer and investor confidence. In short: a 
terrorist attack on critical infrastructure can affect “all European citizens, inhabitants of the 
European Union, the Member State governments and the European Union as a whole” 
(Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2006a:  9).  In  recent  years,  the  EU  has 
included  bio-terrorism  into  the  forms  of  large-scale  terrorism  that  can  cause  equally 
complex  and  serious  macroeconomic  consequences  (Commission  of  the  European 
Communities 2007d).  
The EU’s modelling takes the complexity of potential consequences in account, and 
proposes a categorisation of potential costs (impacts) in the case of a large-scale terrorist 
attack  against  a  particular  infrastructure  asset,  according  to  the  following  five  criteria 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 10-11):
  
 costs for the owners/operators that were the target of the attack; 
 costs for other actors located in the physical proximity of the target;  
 costs for associated actors (e.g. business partners); 
 costs for all other actors including the broader public; and 
 costs for government’s emergency response and reconstruction efforts.  
In order to visualise the snowball effects that such large-scale terrorist attacks may cause in 
terms of macroeconomic costs (not only on critical infrastructure), the document adds a 
passage with quantitative evaluations of terrorist attacks from the past. According to this 
evaluation, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania  in  1998,  which  killed  altogether  more  than  3.000  people,  cost  a  total  of 
approximately $ 2 trillion. The attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, where four suicide 
truck  bombings  hit  four  different  targets  and  killed  62  people,  also  had  a  significant 
macroeconomic impact, as they reversed the country's economic recovery and caused a 
capital outflow by Western investors. In the case of the attacks in Madrid, Sharm el Sheikh 




impact”  (potential  cost  of  lost  business,  reconstruction,  insurance  and  security)  was 
presumed to be high, although the damage to Spain and the UK in terms of GDP “appears 
to have been negligible” (Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 11). What is 
striking is the strong disproportionality between the costs incurred by the public as a result 
of the terrorist attacks, on the one hand, and the costs for the actual preparation of these 
attacks.  Policy-makers,  obviously,  have  to  realise  that  “terrorist  attacks themselves  are 
increasingly inexpensive to conduct” (Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 
10-11). 
Costs and consequences of EU action against terrorism and organised crime  
Given  the  perceived  complexity  and  variegation  of  terrorism  and  organised  crime,  the 
question  for  European  policy-makers  is  not  only  how  insecurity  can  be  reduced  and 
Europe’s  citizens  best  protected  from  these  threats,  but  also  at  what  price.  Are  there 
quantifiable benefits for the EU and its Member States, their societies and economies from 
the  action  taken  against  anticipated  insecurity?  The  EU  started  to  reflect  about  the 
economics of security only a few years ago. This might be mainly due to the fact that 
political agents in Europe had first of all to become aware of how to address these two 
sources of insecurity, particularly after the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
While in the 1990s much of the action against terrorism and organised crime within Europe 
was  based  on  the  European  tradition  of  combating  them  through  control  and  penal 
measures, i.e. the enforcement of criminal law in the European national states, the creation 
of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice opened up new possibilities for 
strategy formulation and action through the EU structure.  
Most of the early efforts were concerned with the question of how to tackle trans-border 
criminality within the EU “in all its aspects” (European Council 1996). Between 1996 and 
1999, the EU started to introduce a whole range of activities directed at the coordination 
and harmonisation of national legislation as well as the strengthening of police and judicial 
cooperation  in  criminal  matters  among  the  Member  States  (European  Council  1996; 
Council of the European Union 1998a; Council of the European Union 1998d; Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 1998). These efforts 
triggered  two  processes:  first,  they  led  to  the  institutionalisation  and  mobilisation  of 
supranational bodies for the fight against terrorism and organised crime (such as Europol 
and Eurojust) and, second, they triggered more efforts to reform national legislations and 
institutional structures in the Member States.  
Starting with the late 1990s, policy-makers on the EU level were also occupied with 
strategy  formulation. This refers to both a definition of security and security policy  in 
general and strategies against organised crime and terrorism in Europe in particular. Two 
distinctive features dominant to the Union’s definition of security and security policy also 
characterise the EU’s strategic approach to combating organised crime and terrorism. The 
first assumption is that insecurity is multifaceted and that the causes of insecurity can have 
both a long-term (structural) and a short-term (proximate) dimension. As a consequence, 
responsive  security  strategies  should  be  designed  in  an  equally  multifaceted, 
comprehensive way. The EU has developed a respective security response, which is guided 
by the idea of prevention and follows a holistic approach. The second assumption, put up 
at the 1999 Tampere Summit (European Council 1999) and since then a widely accepted 
principle in the EU, is that internal and external security are increasingly intertwined and 




domestic  and  international  security  as  a  core  aspect  (European  Union  2003;  European 
Council 2005). 
These two principles have been – implicitly and explicitly – incorporated into the EU’s 
response strategy to organised crime, which emerged in the late 1990s. Already in 1997, 
the EU adopted the Action Plan on Organised Crime (Council of the European Union 
1997a) and in 2000 issued the Millennium Strategy on Combating Organised Crime. Both 
documents  are  informed  by  the  idea  of  a  comprehensive  response,  and  advocate  for 
enhancing anti-crime cooperation within the EU and globally ( European Union 2000: 49, 
51). Already in its Dublin conclusions (European Council 1996), as well as in a resolution 
from  1998  (Council  of  the  European  Union  1998b),  the  Council  had  considered 
intelligence-led  prevention  just  as  important  as  law  enforcement  and  crime  control  in 
providing  an  effective  response  to organised  crime,  but  the  issue  came  to  carry  more 
weight only gradually, and finally appeared much more prominently in the Millennium 
Strategy. Prevention is here defined as a policy that aims at reducing crime opportunities 
and the opportunities to profit from crime, e.g. through the tracing, freezing, seizing and 
confiscating of criminal proceeds (European Union 2000: 8). A year later, the Commission 
specified what it meant by crime prevention, and introduced the concept of situational 
prevention (Commission of the European Communities 2001b: 7), an approach based on 
the assumption that organised criminals are highly rational actors who have to be deprived 
of  immediate  opportunities  for  criminal  conduct.  Situational  prevention  is  intended  to 
make criminal conduct more difficult and risky, less rewarding and excusable and, thus, is 
considered to have a direct and quick impact on the nature and level of organised crime in 
Europe  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2001a:  10).  However,  under  a 
situational preventive approach, addressing the root causes of crime (such as facilitating 
socio-economic structures) is – if at all – only of minor importance. 
After the terrorist attacks in New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the 
political agents within the EU actively engaged in strategy formulation in the fight against 
terrorism  and  once  again  made  the  two  principles  a  core  element  of  counter-terrorism 
policies.  First,  the  Union’s  objective  was  to  strengthen  the  national  law  enforcement 
capabilities  though  the  introduction  of  new  legislative  instruments  as  well  as  a 
harmonisation  and  better  coordination  of  policies  among  the  Member  States.  For  this 
purpose, immediately after 9/11, the Council adopted a comprehensive counter-terrorism 
Action Plan (Council of the European Union 2001) and a Road Map for its implementation 
(European  Council  2001).  The  2002  Council  Framework  Decision  on  Combating 
Terrorism set additional objectives for legal approximation within the EU (Council of the 
European  Union  2002b).  The  immediate  terrorist  threat,  secondly,  gave  a  push  to  the 
European  Arrest  Warrant,  which  was  adopted  in  June  2002  (Council  of  the  European 
Union 2002a). On the national levels, the Member States supplemented these efforts with a 
number of domestic institutional reforms, which, yet, due to national peculiarities, had a 
very individual character (Ek, et al. 2002). Finally, the considerations from the ESS and the 
Hague  Programme,  as  well  as  the  new  experience  of  international  terrorism  targeting 
European capitals, were incorporated into the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of 
the European Union 2005). Consistently with the demands made in the earlier documents, 
this strategy reflects a more mature policy response, as it, first, follows a proactive and 




response. The Counter-Terrorism Strategy
3 is structured along the following four areas 
(pillars) of action:  
 to prevent people from turning to terrorism, by tackling the factors and structural 
(root) causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment; 
 to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce the EU’s vulnerability to attacks, 
including through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure;  
 to pursue and investigate terrorists across EU borders and worldwide by enhancing 
the intelligence and law-enforcement systems as well as strengthening police and 
judicial cooperation across the EU and worldwide; and  
 to  respond  to  the  consequences  of  terrorist  attacks  when  they  occur  by  way  of 
improving the civilian and military capabilities for civil protection.  
As can be gathered from the review of the emerging European policy against terrorism and 
organised  crime,  the  range  of  possible  fields  of  actions  and  measures  under  such  a 
comprehensive responsive approach  is  broad and vast. This, consequently, also applies 
with regard to the costs. The costs that are incurred by European societies and economies 
can be classified into actions taken in order to (i) mitigate the impact of insecurity and (ii) 
to minimise the risk of organised crime and terrorism to harm societies and economies. 
The latter broadly aims at combating the structural or proximate causes of insecurity. As 
protective action is taken both at the (EU) national and the supranational level, one can 
assume that costs are generated to both. As would seem  natural, the bulk of costs are 
incurred by the Member States, since law enforcement and crime prevention is mainly 
implemented by the EU Member States. The EU’s role in this process is more one of 
coordinating the security action of the Member States through the issuing of directives and 
regulations, as well as of enhancing cooperation and information exchange. However, as 
will be seen, the EU also contributes financial resources from its budget to the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime.  
 What information about the spending for anti-crime and counter-terrorism activities in 
the EU can be traced, then? The figures available are often only fragmentary, or reflect 
more rough calculations. In fact, a comparison of figures across the EU is rather difficult. 
The  reasons  for  this  are  manifold.  First,  the  EU  countries  vary  in  size  and  level  of 
affection,  i.e.  have  very  different  policy  priorities.  Second,  the  institutional  and 
organisational  structures  (services  and  instruments)  in  counter-terrorism  and  anti-crime 
policies vary significantly among the EU Member States. Third, the Member States use 
different financial reporting systems when indicating national public expenses for counter-
terrorism and anti-crime policies. Finally, terrorism and organised crime are most often 
cross-cutting  to traditional  policy  areas,  involving  multiple  ministries  and  departments. 
Looking at the financial dimension of costs, the part of security costs that may be attributed 
to counter-terrorism or anti-crime is extremely difficult to identify (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006a: 13). 
A certain degree of comparability is provided by Eurostat statistics on EU-wide public 
spending, which use the sum-up category ‘public order and safety’
4 in order to calculate 
national expenditures for internal security such as police services, fire protection services, 
law courts, prisons, and research and development. The data here are limited to relative 
                                                 
3 All in all, the most recent Action Plan published in March 2007 (Council of the European Union 2007d) lists more than 
160 individual measures. 
4  The  category  ‘Public  Order  and  Safety’  is  used  within  the  United  Nation’s  Classification  of  the  Functions  of 




figures in the context of final expenditures within the national GDPs (Eurostat 2006: 3). A 
glance on absolute figures reveals that the total amounts of reported expenses for ‘public 
order and safety’ vary significantly in the Member States.
5 The data indicate that the UK 
and Spain show the highest figures in spending, while, at the same time, the expenses for 
internal security/‘public order and safety’ have been continuously rising in all EU Member 
States since the early 1990s. 
It  is  much  easier  to  identify  quantifiable  costs  of  counter-terrorism  and  anti-crime 
policies on the EU  level. Indicators can  be  found  in the European Union’s  budget. In 
February 2007, the EU introduced more funding opportunities in the JHA area under the 
new  Financial  Perspectives  2007-2013.  Out  of  the  three  established  framework 
programmes, one, called ‘Security and safeguarding Liberties’, is dedicated to the fight 
against organised crime and terrorism. This programme is endowed with a total budget of € 
745  million  (Council  of  the  European  Union  2007b;  European  Commission  2007:  2). 
Types of interventions under this heading include grants as well as public procurement 
contracts  (Council  of  the  European  Union  2007c).  Other  JLS-relevant  activities  are 
pursued  through  the  First  Pillar  and,  thus,  are  also  eligible  to  be  funded  from  the 
Community budget. This refers to all activities connected with immigration and asylum 
matters  as  well  as  to  regional  development  within  the  EU  and  assistance  to  Third 
Countries. Italy for instance receives anti-crime assistance from the EU’s structural fonds 
for  four  of  its  southern  regions  (La  Spina  2006:  650).  While  diplomatic  means  and 
international coordination in JLS-relevant external activity require little or no money from 
the  EU,  financial  resources  for  enhancing  security  worldwide  are  mainly  needed  for 
structural development (long-term prevention) and capacity-building programmes (short-
term prevention), e.g. for  law enforcement, customs and  judiciary  in partner countries. 
Such activities are financed through the Community’s external assistance programmes and 
other specific Community budget lines, which altogether comprise a total of € 7 billion per 
year. Around € 400 million out of this total sum goes to specifically counter-terrorism-
related external assistance (for 80 countries). In 2006, the EU established two additional 
JHA-related  financial  instruments: the Instrument for Stability and the Civil Protection 
Financial  Instrument.  The  first  instrument  (European  Parliament  and  Council  of  the 
European Union 2006) provides financial assistance (during 2007-2013) for EU immediate 
crisis response and the promotion of stability towards third countries – a precondition to 
containing  the  spread  of  transnational  security  threats  such  as  terrorism  and  organised 
crime. It is budgeted with € 2,06 billion, which correspond to five per cent of the total 
external relations budget of the Union. The Civil Protection Financial Instrument (Council 
of the European Union 2007a) provides € 189,8 million (also during 2007-2013) for rapid 
response  and  preparedness  actions  of  the  Member  States  to  major  emergencies  and 
disasters. 
Finally, on what basis do European policy agents decide on the allocation of funds? 
Have policy-makers ever tried to calculate the quantifiable costs that can accrue for the 
protection against terrorism  and organised crime?  Do  for instance standardized  criteria 
exist according to which the costs and the effectiveness of  specific policy  choices are 
estimated in terms of costs and benefits? The official documents and respective literature 
suggest that cost-benefit calculations only slowly started to play a role in the definition of 
JLS-relevant policies, although the EU has always made use of such buzzwords like policy 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ in its official statements (e.g. Commission of the European 
                                                 




Communities 2001b: 8; Council of the European Union 2007d; European Council 2005: 
2). However, none of the EU’s documents give a clarification as to how ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘efficiency’ should be understood, nor do they mention any measures or actions by which 
costs and benefits of certain decisions, regulations or programmes should be evaluated. 
Obviously, such demands were not (primarily) guided by economic thinking, but rather 
reflect  the  effort  to  establish  common  and  harmonised  standards  among  the  Member 
States. In this sense, evaluations of JHA-relevant policies have until recently been reserved 
for  peer  evaluation  processes,  by  which  the  compliance  with,  and  implementation  of, 
common legislative, administrative and technical arrangements in the Member States (for 
example in the area of counter-terrorism arrangements connected to the 2002 Framework 
Decision) have been assessed. 
But  the  terrorist  attacks  in  New  York,  Madrid  and  London  altered  the  rationales 
underlying the choices of European political agents with regard to resource allocations in 
the JLSA domain. A cross-national comparison of counter-terrorism policies in Canada 
and  selected  EU  Member  States  (France,  Germany  and  the  UK)  conducted  prior  to 
September 11, 2001 revealed that national policy agents “because of limited resources [...] 
made  funding  decisions  for  programs  to  combat  terrorism  based  on  the  likelihood  of 
terrorist activity actually taking place, not the country’s overall vulnerability to terrorist 
attack” (United States General Accounting Office 2000: 5). After 9/11, it became clear that 
societies, and particularly economies, are highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as such 
attacks can have a significant negative impact on economic processes and activities, and 
may  also  spill  over  to  other  sectors,  causing  immense  secondary  costs  to  a  society. 
Consequently,  reflecting  about,  and  being  able  to  estimate,  the  costs  of  policies  and 
measures against sources of insecurity has become more and more important for European 
policy agents, particularly since 2005.  
It appears not surprising that, of all potential scenarios, the Commission chose the field 
of critical infrastructure protection in 2006 in order to develop, for the first time, a single 
analytic framework for a cost assessment of counter-terrorism policy (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006a). Critical infrastructure is perceived to be highly vulnerable, 
and the negative economic consequences of a terrorist attack on such infrastructure can be 
particularly high. Two important insights should be pointed out here: First, the negative 
economic impact of a terrorist attack is determined by its nature and scale, both of which 
can display a high complexity, and therefore is not easy to be generalized. Second, the 
assumption goes that the higher the vulnerability of a target, the higher the assumable costs 
of  protecting  it.  However,  policy-makers  are  not  free  to  spend  as  much  resources  on 
protective policies as they like, but must rely on the acceptance of their citizenry when the 
costs increase, particularly the taxpayers, as some security costs will have to be paid for 
out of taxation (e.g. border surveillance, law enforcement staff, armed response units on 
standby, security of government buildings and networks), and private economic actors, 
since security legislation might increase the costs for economic activity in general. A lack 
of acceptance on the part of the business community might have negative consequences, as 
it  may  push  some  business  away  from  the  EU  to  less  security-conscious  nations 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006a: 13). 
In more recent documents, as for example the 2006 impact assessment, the Commission 
finally suggested to align costly security policy choices along three principles in order to 
avoid negative reactions: effectiveness, cost-efficiency and proportionality.  
 Effectiveness means that the resources allocated to combating sources of insecurity 
in  fact  do  have  a  deterrent  effect  and  can  prevent  a  security  threat  from 




the  European  economy  and  generate  significant  quantifiable  benefits:  it  would 
prevent losses from reduced trade flows and investment which undermine economic 
growth, and help to protect companies and jobs, contributing to enhancing internal 
and  external  competitiveness  and  speeding  up  economic  growth  in  general 
(Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2006a:  18).  However,  it  is 
acknowledged  that  it  is  nearly  impossible  to  prove  whether  preventive  security 
measures are effective, as it will be “virtually impossible to quantify the deterrent 
effect of any security measures, i.e. whether terrorists would have tried an attack if 
those  measures  were  not  in  place”  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
2006a: 13). 
 Cost-efficiency means that security measures must effectively pay for themselves. 
Here,  too,  some  problems  arise,  in  particular  when  comparing  terrorism  and 
organised  crime.  The  Commission  has  underlined  that  there  are  “significant 
differences between the costing philosophy for measures to fight crime (i.e. criminal 
acts  for  monetary  gain)  and  those  to  fight  terrorism  (i.e.  criminal  acts  to  cause 
destruction and fear).” This is ascribed to the fact that acts of crime are much more 
frequent  than  acts  of  terrorism.  Counter-crime  measures,  therefore,  could  be 
regarded as effectively paying for themselves in terms of reduced financial losses. 
Commercial organisations, however, may allow a measure of loss due to criminal 
acts (e.g. fraud or theft) because measures to give absolute protection against these 
acts are seen as not cost-effective. Security against terrorism, on the other hand, 
could be regarded as a waste of money if an attack does not happen (Commission of 
the European Communities 2006a: 12). 
 Proportionality  means  that  policy  measures  must  keep  a  balance  between  the 
expected costs and their potential effects. According to the EU, the principle of 
proportionality should prevail in those cases where the benefits of security policy are 
uncertain  and  could  potentially  be  outweighed  by  the  indirect  costs  they  could 
induce  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2007a:  28).  Assessing  the 
proportionality  of  the  preferred  policy  option  is  seen  as  extremely  difficult  with 
regard to terrorism, as it can easily cause disproportionate consequences for (EU) 
citizens,  reaching  well  beyond  the  direct  costs  like  the  loss  of  life,  injury  and 
property damage. Simultaneously, the reactions of security agencies can themselves 
induce  massive  costs  and  inconvenience  on  (EU)  citizens.  It  has  also  been 
underlined that the principle of proportionality should not be limited to financial 
considerations,  but  also  apply  to  the  balance  between  security  and  liberty 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007b: 5-6; European Data Protection 
Supervisor 2008: 11).  
The Union has only recently started to commission impact assessments of JHA-related 
activities with particular focus on progresses, effectiveness and cost-efficiency (European 
Commission 2006). With regard to (organised) crime, the EU (DG Justice, Freedom and 
Security)  has  commissioned  ex-post  evaluations  of  the  Grotius  II,  Oisin  II,  STOP  II, 
Falcone and Hippocrates Programmes as well as an interim evaluation of AGIS. Among 
others,  evaluation  criteria  are  ‘effectiveness’  and  ‘efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness’. 
‘Effectiveness’  refers  to  an  assessment  of  the  output,  outcome  and  impact  of  the 
programmes,  while  ‘efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness’  include  assessments  of  the 
economic conversion of the inputs, measuring the output and outcome of the programmes 
in relation to the human and financial resources invested as well as the appropriateness of 
the allocated budget and the financial assets invested (European Commission 2005). It has 




generalized is limited, since the evaluation criteria are methodologically tailored to the 
specific  needs  of  the  various  programmes.  With  special  regard  to  terrorism,  the 
Commission has issued a tender to evaluate the ‘Pilot Project for Fighting Terrorism’ and 
the ‘Preparatory Action on Victims of Terrorism’, the results of which are still due.  
CONCLUSION 
The  historical  mapping  of  notions  of  terrorism  and  organised  crime  and  of  respective 
security  policies  within  the  EU  shows  a  very  complex  picture.  The  analysis  reveals 
manifold and sometimes diverse dynamics with regard to threat perceptions and policy 
preferences of European political agents. The official documents do not account for a clear 
‘historical’ (i.e. linear) evolvement of the perceived threat level, the patterns of terrorism 
and organised crime and the motivations of the actors of insecurity. Instead, the analysis 
discovers  a  number  of  changes  and  continuities  which  are  characteristic  for  the 
development of threat perceptions in Europe since the 1990s. It seems evident that, due to 
broader historical experiences with terrorism, political agents in Europe accepted terrorism 
as a  major  source of  insecurity  more willingly  than organised crime and  were able to 
reconnect the older notions of insecurity with the ‘new’ terrorist threat after 9/11. This 
might also explain the ruptures in, and pushes to, threat perceptions as are manifested in 
the official documents following the terrorist attacks in New York (2001), and later in 
Madrid  (2004)  and  London  (2005).  Changes  in  perceptions  on  organised  crime  as  a 
security  threat  came  much  more  smoothly  and  seamlessly.  Another  ambiguity  can  be 
traced  with  regard  to  the  level  of  reflectivity  represented  in  the  documents.  At  many 
instances, considerations remain on a very general level and have a rather sporadic nature. 
The  mantra-like reiteration that terrorism  is  a  “major threat” to European security,  for 
instance,  often  lacks  substantive  justifications.  At  other  instances,  documents  exhibit  a 
more mature and in-depth stage of reflection. The EU has for instance has tried to grasp the 
network character of ‘new’ terrorism and organised crime, and has made significant efforts 
to  understand  the  reasons  how  and  why  people  turn  to  radical  violence  and  become 
terrorists. 
The considerations about the costs and consequences of terrorism and organised crime 
on the part of European policy-makers show similar ambiguities, although a more ‘linear’ 
process  is  visible  here.  With  regard  to  the  perceived  consequences  of  terrorism  and 
organised crime, official documents, both at the EU level and in the Member States (as far 
as they exist), have become more and more sophisticated and, though only recently, are 
also informed by economic thinking, not least because of a growing awareness that, due to 
a  high  degree  of  interdependency,  the  European  economies  are  highly  vulnerable  to 
terrorist attacks and organised crime. First attempts to measure ‘harm’ and calculate the 
costs deriving from insecurity have been made. However, it has been acknowledged that 
such endeavours are extremely difficult from a methodological point of view. Similarly, 
European  counter-terrorism  and  anti-crime  policies  have  been  embedded  in  a  sort  of 
‘learning curve’, significantly influenced and pushed by the creation of the European Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice and, as a consequence, the emergence of the EU as an 
increasingly important actor in the formulation and coordination of European policies in 
the JHA domain. The EU had also a leading role in formulating a ‘new’ strategic vision of 
security policy, linking internal and external aspects of insecurity and putting an emphasis 
on a comprehensive (reactive and preventive) security policy. However, efforts to calculate 




account the rather limited resources available to political institutions, do not seem to have 
chances of success.    
Overall, we can extract a number of indicators from the analysis that might hint at some 
underlying logics according to which notions of insecurity are shaped:  
 Path dependency: under this logic, political agents basically follow, and stick to, 
established  ideas  and  solutions,  complementing  them  with  new  perceptions  and 
activities against terrorism and organised crime. Terrorist attacks or evident cases of 
organised  criminality  merely  serve  as  catalysts  for  plans  to  introduce  measures 
which  are  already  in  place.  Given  the  high  complexity  of  the  two  sources  of 
insecurity and the lack of competence and knowledge necessary to model reasonable 
and methodologically correct scenarios and cost calculations, policy-makers have, in 
many instances, stayed on familiar notional tracks throughout the years.  
 Reacting to the latest incident: when new perceptions about terrorism and organised 
crime  took  root,  or  new  measures  against  these  sources  of  insecurity  were 
introduced in Europe, this was most often a reaction to the latest major incident. We 
were able to trace such reactive logic primarily with regard to terrorism, where it 
was most obvious, but this observation also apply, to a certain extent, to organised 
crime. 
 Obsessions:  political  agents  seem  at times  fixated  on  particular  threat  scenarios, 
which are not necessarily triggered by a real and traceable threat. Thus, a number of 
popular scenarios –  in particular with regard to terrorism –  have  become  firmly 
established, the likelihood of which, however, remains unclear. The logic behind 
such  a  fixation  might  be  the  persistence  of  underlying,  basically  irrational 
projections about the intents of actors of insecurity, or traumatic experiences from 
the past leading to some kind of over-alertness and, thus, making fear a guiding 
principle for the formation of policy preferences and choices.   
 Institutional interests: countering crime and terrorism in Europe is first of all a task 
of the EU Member States. However, the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice certainly opened up new perspectives on sources of insecurity as well as 
new  possibilities  for  strategic  action  on  the  EU  level.  This  has  given  way  to  a 
(partially) reshuffling of competences with regard to JHA on the European scene. 
The EU has tried to extend its competences and capacities in this field towards the 
supranational level. One field of action that has made particular career in this respect 
is civil protection. Nevertheless, the bulk of responsibility still remains at the level 
of  Member  State,  as  do  the  bulk  of  costs  for  counter-terrorism  and  anti-crime 
policies. 
 Importance of cost-benefit calculations: although, in recent years, European policy-
makers  have  started  to  consider  the  economic  dimension  of  (in)security  more 
thoroughly, a pure economic approach to the formation of policy preferences within 
the EU seems rather unrealistic. Political agents repeatedly underline that terrorism 
and  organised  crime  induce  not  only  material,  but  also  a  whole  range  of  non-
material costs, which are extremely difficult to quantify. A purely economically-
driven logic, thus, seems politically not opportune, except for such cases where the 
persuasiveness of the (material) cost argument is high, for instance in the case of 
attacks on critical  infrastructure or bio-terrorism, as well as  in case of  verifiable 




This  preliminary  set  of  criteria,  derived  from  a  distinctly  European  perspective,  might 
serve as a starting point for further research on the underlying determinants of security 
policy choices and the mechanisms guiding the economics of security. 
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